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Enforceability of OECD Linking Rules in the Light of 
EU Law 
Bruno Vanden Berghe* 
ABSTRACT 
To counter tax arbitrage resulting from the use of hybrid financial instruments, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggested the 
implementation of anti-hybrid mismatch rules, which align the domestic tax treatment of hybrid 
financial instruments with their tax treatment in foreign countries. This paper assesses the 
enforceability of these so-called “linking rules” in the light of European Union (EU) law. 
Since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has yet to rule on their relation to EU law, 
considerable weight is assigned to legal literature and comparable ECJ case law. Following the 
various steps of the analytical framework adopted by the ECJ, the author concludes that 
OECD linking rules are enforceable in the light of EU law, provided that the Member States 
implementing these rules domestically complement them with additional conditions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Benjamin Franklin once famously said: “In this world nothing can be said to be 
certain, except death and taxes”.1 Nevertheless, in today’s globalized world, 
these words seem to be rather meaningless. Multinational corporations such as 
* Executive M.Sc. Candidate (Taxation), Solvay Brussels School of Economics &
Management; Member of the Brussels Bar; Winner of the ‘Pump Court Tax Prize’ for 
best performance in Taxation in the LLM Programme 2015-2016. The author wrote this 
paper at the London School of Economics to obtain the title of LL.M. 
1 Benjamin Franklin, The Private Correspondence of Benjamin Franklin (2nd edn, H Colburn 
1817) 266. 
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Google,2 Amazon,3 and Starbucks4 avoid paying taxes by constituting all kinds 
of international tax planning schemes.5 According to Van Rompuy, former 
European Council President, an estimate of €1 trillion revenue is annually lost in 
the EU due to tax avoidance practices.6 Recent policy papers have indicated that 
a considerable amount of this figure could result from cross-border tax 
arbitrage.7 This avoidance technique can be defined as “the act of taking 
advantage of the inconsistencies of more than one country’s tax rules to realize a 
more favourable result than that provided for by a transaction in a single 
jurisdiction”.8 Hybrid financial instruments are commonly used to achieve this 
outcome.9 They can be described as financial instruments that “combine typical 
characteristics of equity and borrowed capital, thereby being economically 
positioned between these two forms of capital”.10 Depending on their 
qualification as either equity or debt, the tax treatment of such instruments may 
differ. Indeed, dividends as compensation for equity are usually not deductible 
by the payer, while the recipients are typically entitled to an exemption. Interests 
as compensation for debt, on the other hand, are deductible by the payer, but 
are taxed in the hands of the recipient.  
Due to the current lack of harmonization in tax classification among 
jurisdictions, the use of hybrid financial instruments in cross border-transactions 
	
	
2 Peter Campbell, ‘Fresh Questions to be raised over Google’s Tax Avoidance as Tech 
Gains Announces Profits of $3.4 Billion’ (Daily Mail, 31 January 2014) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2549379/Fresh-questions-raised-Googles-
tax-avoidance-tech-giant-announces-profits-3-4-billion.html> accessed 10 July 2016.  
3 Ian Griffiths and Simon Bowers, ‘Fresh Questions for Amazon over Pittance It Pays in 
Tax’ (The Guardian, 16 May 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/may/15/amazon-tax-bill-new-
questions> accessed 10 July 2016.  
4 ‘Starbucks Pays UK Corporate Tax for the First Time since 2009’ (BBC, 23 June 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-23019514> accessed 10 July 2016. 
5 Hans van den Hurk, ‘Starbucks versus the People’ (2014) 68(1) BFIT 27, 27. 
6 Georgi Gotev, ‘EU Summit to Grapple with Tax Havens, Evasion and Fraud’ 
(EurActiv, 10 May 2013) <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/eu-leaders-prepare-
tackle-tax-ha-news-519618> accessed 10 July 2016.  
7 OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (Paris, OECD 
Publishing 2012) 5. 
8 Rafael Bispo, ‘Cross-Border Intra-Group Hybrid Finance: A Comparative Analysis of 
the Legal Approach Adopted by Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United States’ 
(2013) 67(7) BFIT 365, 367. 
9 Other techniques include hybrid entities and hybrid transfers.  
10 Christian Kahlenberg, ‘The Tax Treatment of Hybrid Financial Instruments’ (2015) 
55(6) European Taxation 264, 264. 
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may give rise to double tax benefits (“double dip”).11 This occurs when 
compensations for hybrid instruments are deductible in the country of the payer 
without being taxed in the country of the recipient.12 These so-called “mismatch 
arrangements” negatively affect “tax revenue, competition, economic efficiency, 
transparency and fairness”.13 Therefore, in its latest report named “Neutralising 
the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, the OECD suggested that 
Member States implement rules linking the domestic tax classification of hybrid 
financial instruments to their tax classification in foreign countries.14  
Under these “OECD linking rules”, one State could successfully eliminate 
potential mismatches by allowing the deduction of interest payments to foreign 
entities on the condition that the other State does not provide dividend 
exemptions. Analogously, the former State could condition dividend exemptions 
on the refusal of interest deductions by the latter State.15 However, since 
potential mismatches can only arise in cross-border situations, linking rules 
promote a tax treatment of cross-border cases that is heavier than the taxation 
of similar domestic situations. Indeed, regarding domestic transactions, 
dividends are exempt and interests are deductible. Meanwhile, depending on the 
tax outcome in the foreign jurisdiction, the application of linking rules could 
result in the denial of these tax benefits in a cross-border context.  
 
Purpose and approach 
	
According to the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), supranational 
EU law prevails over domestic law. Hence, for tax rules to be enforceable 
domestically, Member States need to respect EU law. Against this background, 
however, one could question the enforceability of linking rules. Indeed, 
according to the fundamental freedoms of the EU incorporated in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),16 payments made to non-
residents must receive the same tax treatment as payments made to residents, 
unless a different treatment can be justified on grounds of an overriding public 
	
	
11 Niels Johannesen, ‘Tax avoidance with cross-border hybrid instruments’ (2014) 112 
Journal of Public Economics 40, 40. 
12 ibid. 
13 OECD (n 7) 11. 
14 OECD, Action 2: Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Paris, OECD 
Publishing 2015) 27. 
15 ibid. 
16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] 
OJ C83/47 (TFEU). See text to n 60 below. 
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interest. Following the analytical framework of the ECJ, this paper will analyse 
these concepts and determine whether the more onerous tax treatment of non-
residents, resulting from the application of linking rules, violates the EU 
fundamental freedoms. It will also tackle the extent to which such potential 
violation could be justified.  
The aim of this paper is to answer the following research question: “Are 
the OECD linking rules proposed in Action 2 to address tax arbitrage 
enforceable in the light of EU law?”. However, before doing so, this paper 
examines the following preliminary issues: 
• (1) What are hybrid financial instruments? (2) How are these 
instruments treated in the Netherlands and the United States (US)? 
• What initiatives did the OECD undertake to tackle tax arbitrage? 
• Do linking rules discriminate against non-residents who are in a similar 
situation as residents? 
• Can a potential discrimination be justified on grounds of public 
interest, while, likewise, passing the proportionality test?  
 
Methodology 
	
This paper applies a combination of different research methods.17 Firstly, a 
comparative legal method is used to determine the risk of hybrid mismatches 
between the Netherlands and the US. Hence, the tax treatment practices of 
hybrid financial instruments in both countries are compared to each other.18 In 
this regard, the PepsiCo case will be used as a case study.  
Furthermore, a traditional legal method is applied in analysing the relevant 
materials regarding OECD linking rules. Thus, different sources of law are 
evaluated throughout this paper including domestic legislation, OECD 
recommendations, as well as sources of both primary and secondary EU law. 
Moreover, since no judgment of the ECJ exists regarding the relationship 
between OECD linking rules and EU fundamental freedoms, this study assigns 
considerable weight to legal literature and comparable case law of the ECJ, 
together with the relevant opinions of the Advocate-Generals (AG).  
	
	
17 Qunfang Jiang and Yifan Yuan, ‘Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law’ 
(2014) 54(10) European Taxation 470, 470. 
18 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, OUP 
1998) 2. 
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Delimitation 
	
In addition to hybrid financial instruments, mismatches can emerge from hybrid 
entities. Those are single business entities that are treated as transparent in one 
State and as opaque in another, likewise resulting in double non-taxation.19 A 
detailed analysis of such arrangements, however, falls outside the scope of this 
work. 
This paper exclusively studies the relationship between linking rules and 
EU fundamental freedoms. Hence, the issue of compatibility with the non-
discrimination principle regarding the deductibility of interests incorporated in 
Article 24(4) OECD Model Convention will be ignored. 
Despite their affiliation with the topic, transfer pricing and thin 
capitalization fall beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Outline 
	
The introduction sets out the background and the purpose, together with the 
relevant research questions addressed in this paper. The first part describes what 
hybrid financial instruments are and how they operate in a cross-border context. 
The second part covers linking rules, the solution to tax arbitrage proposed by 
the OECD in BEPS Action 2, and elaborates on how these would work in 
practice. The third and central part outlines the various steps of the analytical 
framework adopted by the ECJ. Following these steps, the enforceability of 
OECD linking rules is, subsequently, analysed in the light of EU law. The final 
part summarizes the essential findings, and provides an answer to the main 
research question. 
 
I. HYBRID FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: A TECHNIQUE FOR 
TAX ARBITRAGE 
 
	
	
19 Robert Danon, ‘Qualification of Taxable Entities and Treaty Protection’ (2014) 
68(4/5) BFIT 192, 192. 
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Concept 
 
Hybrid financial instruments present elements that may characterize them as 
equity as much as debt. Hence, they can be described as “a combined face of 
equity and debt”.20 Several forms of hybrid financing exist. Examples not only 
include traditional instruments, such as redeemable shares which grant their 
holder a claim on a preferred dividend, but also more innovative instruments, 
such as profit participating loans which, unlike conventional loans, provide 
interest rates that are performance linked.21 
Because they can differ in numerous dimensions including maturity, voting 
rights and return, a wide variety of hybrid instruments exists, ranging from pure 
equity (no maturity, no fixed return, right to vote) to pure debt (fix maturity, fix 
return, no right to vote).22 
 
 
From an economic perspective, hybrid financial instruments are often 
used, because they can adapt accurately to the needs of investors and issuers.23 
For example, profit participating loans are particularly advantageous in 
circumstances where the risk of the investment (for example, country risk) can 
provoke the need to divest or reduce the capital commitment as soon as 
possible.24 In addition to economic reasons, tax motives also play a significant 
role in adopting hybrid financing. Indeed, in a cross-border context 
qualification, conflicts between two countries can lead to tax advantages.25 In 
the remainder of this paper, the emphasis is placed on the tax consequences of 
hybrid financing. 
 
	
	
20 Antonio Russo and Omar Moerer, ‘Chapter 1: Introduction’ in Anuschka Bakker and 
Marc M Levey (eds), Transfer Pricing and Intra-Group Financing (IBFD 2012) 30. 
21 Kahlenberg (n 10) 265. 
22 Johannesen (n 11) 41. 
23 Bispo (n 8) 365. 
24 Russo (n 20) 30. 
25 Bispo (n 8) 365. 
Debt Hybrid Financial Instruments Equity 
Figure 1: Range of Hybrid Financial Instruments 
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2. Hybrid financial instruments: a technique for tax arbitrage 
2.1. Concept 
Hybrid financial instruments present elements that may characterize them as equity as much as 
debt. Hence, they can be described as “a combined face of equity and debt”.20 Several forms of 
hybrid financing exist. Examples not only include traditional instruments such as redeemable 
shares which grant their holder a claim on a preferred dividend, but also more innovative 
instruments such as profit participating loans which, unlike conventional loans, provide interest 
rates that are perform nce linked.21 
Because they can differ in numerous dimensions including maturity, voting rights and return, a 
wide variety of hybrid instruments exists, ranging from pure equity (no maturity, no fixed 
return, right to vote) to pure debt (fix maturity, fix return, no right to vote).22 
 
From an economic perspective, hybrid financial instruments are often used, because they can 
adapt accurately to the needs of investors and issuers.23 For example, profit participating loans 
are particularly advantageous in circumstances where the risk of the investme t (e.g. country 
risk) can provoke the need to divest or reduce the capital commitment as soon as possible.24 In 
addition to economic reasons, tax motives also play a significant role in adopting hybrid 
financing. Indeed, i  a cross-border co text qualification co flicts between two countries can 
lead to tax advantages.25 In the remainder of this paper, the emphasize is placed on the tax 
consequences of hybrid financing. 
2.2. Classification issue 
In most tax systems, dividends as compensation for equity are taxed in the hands of the payer, 
while interests as compensation for debt are taxed in the hands of the recipient since they are 
                                                          
20 Antonio Russo & Omar Moerer, ‘Chapter 1: Introduction’ in Anuschka Bakker and Marc Levey (eds.), Transfer 
Pricing d Intra-Group Financing (IBFD 2012) 30. 
21 Kahlenberg (n9) 265. 
22 Johannesen (n10) 41. 
23 Bispo (n7) 365. 
24 Russo (n18) 30. 
25 Bispo (n7) 365. 
Debt Hybrid Financial Instruments Equity
Figure 1: Range of Hybrid Financial Instruments 
2017] LSE LAW REVIEW 
 
69 
Classification issue 
	
In most tax systems, dividends as compensation for equity are taxed in the 
hands of the payer, while interests as compensation for debt are taxed in the 
hands of the recipient since they are deductible by the payer.26 Thus, from a tax 
perspective, the distinction between debt and equity is relevant.27  
Corporate tax systems classify financial instruments as either debt or 
equity. However, since hybrid financial instruments combine elements of both, 
their qualification for tax purposes can be challenging.28 Moreover, this 
classification issue is a matter of domestic law which may differ between 
jurisdictions.29  
For example, in the Netherlands, the tax treatment of a financial 
instrument as either debt or equity depends, in principle, on its civil law 
classification.30 However, following the case law of De Hoge Raad (the Dutch 
Supreme Court), loans can be qualified, in exceptional circumstances, as equity 
for tax purposes and, thus, the interest is regarded as a non-deductible dividend 
payment.31 Such a “recharacterisation” may occur regarding sham loans, loss 
financing loans and participating loans, provided that the following conditions 
are met: 
• The height of the interest depends on the profit of the borrower; and 
• The principal amount is subordinated to ordinary creditors; and 
• The principal amount has no maturity or is perpetual.32 
In the US, courts look beyond the legal form of a transaction to determine 
its substance. This so-called “substance-over-form” principle has been upheld 
by US case law for decades.33 According to this principle, the tax treatment of a 
transaction is determined by its economic substance. Therefore, the Internal 
	
	
26 Sven Bärsch, Taxation of Hybrid Financial Instruments and the Remuneration Derived Therefrom 
in an International and Cross-Border Context (Springer 2012) 1. 
27 Gabriël van Gelder and Boudewijn Niels, ‘Tax Treatment of Hybrid Financial 
Instruments’ (2013) 15(4) Derivatives & Financial Instruments 140, 140. 
28 Martin Six, ‘Hybrid Finance and Double Taxation Treaties’ (2009) 63(1) BFIT 22, 22.  
29 Peter Blessing, ‘The Debt-Equity Conundrum – A Prequel’ (2012) 66(4) BFIT 198, 
203. 
30 HR, 27 Jan 1988, No 23919, BNB 1988: 217 (“Unileverarrest”); HR, 8 Sep 2006, No 
42015, BNB 2007: 104 (“Kaspische Zee-Arrest”).   
31 ibid.  
32 Michiel van der Breggen, ‘Chapter 13: Netherlands’ in Bakker (n 20) 429. 
33 SC, 1935, Gregory v Helvering, 293 US 465 (1935); SC, 1978, Frank Lyon Co v United States, 
435 US 561 (1978).   
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Revenue Code provides a list of characteristics which courts can consider when 
assigning a hybrid instrument to either the debt or equity group.34  
 
Tax arbitrage 
	
Due to the lack of coordination between jurisdictions regarding their 
qualification (for example, the Netherlands and the US), hybrid financing can be 
used for tax arbitrage purposes.35 As mentioned above, this concept refers to the 
act of taking advantage of differences between tax systems to minimize taxes.36 
Indeed, for multinationals, hybrid financing leads to tax planning opportunities, 
because qualification conflicts may result in double non-taxation. For instance, a 
hybrid financial instrument is considered debt in the country of the payer while 
regarded as equity in the country of the recipient. Consequently, no taxation is 
due, since the payment is deductible in the hands of the payer while being 
exempt in the hands of the recipient.37 The OECD provides the following 
example regarding these so-called “deduction/non-inclusion schemes”:38  
 
 
	
	
34 Internal Revenue Code (IRC), s 385(b). 
35 OECD (n 7) 5. 
36 Bispo (n 8) 367. 
37 Johannesen (n 11) 40. 
38 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements (Paris, OECD Publishing 
2014) 33. 
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B Co (resident in Country B) issues a hybrid financial instrument to A Co 
(resident in Country A). The instrument is regarded as debt for the purposes of 
Country B's law and Country B provides a deduction for interest payments 
made under the instrument, while Country A’s law grants an exemption 
regarding the same payments.39 Hence, no taxes are due on the financial 
compensation from B Co. to A Co. 
The aforementioned example provided by the OECD is reasonably 
straightforward. In practice, however, more elaborate schemes are used to 
explain the same outcome. In this regard, the PepsiCo case can be used as a case 
study. 
 
Case study: Peps iCo 
	
In the PepsiCo case,40 the US Tax Court examined the characterization of Pepsi’s 
advance agreements for tax purposes. The group structure of the soft drink 
multinational can be structured as follows: 
 
	
	
39 ibid 34, para 53. 
40 PepsiCo Puerto Rico Inc et al v Commissioner (TC Memo 2012-269) 
<http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/pepsicomemo.TCM.WPD.pdf> accessed 
24 June 2016. 
US 
7 
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deductible in the hands of the payer while being exempt in the hands of the recipient.37 The 
OECD provides the following example regarding these so-called “deduction/non-inclusion 
schemes”:38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B Co (resident in Country B) issues a hybrid financial instrument to A Co (resident in Country 
A). The instrument is regarded as debt for the purposes of Country B law and Country B 
provides a deduction for interest payments made under the instrument while Country A law 
gives an exemption regarding the same payments.39 Hence, no taxes are due on the financial 
compensation from B Co. to  Co. 
The above example of the OECD is reasonably straightforward. In practice, however, more 
elaborate schemes arise to achieve the same outcome. In this regard, the PepsiCo case can be 
used as a case study. 
                                                          
36 Bispo (n7) 367. 
37 Johannesen (n10) 40. 
38 OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, (Paris: OECD Publishing 2014), 33. 
39 Ibid, 34, par. 53. 
A Co. 
B Co. 
Country A 
Country B Hybride 
financial 
instrument 
Figure 2: OECD Example deduction/non-inclusion scheme 
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In the mid-1990s, the US company PepsiCo wanted to establish its brand 
in Asia and Eastern Europe. Instead of moving funds from the US directly to its 
overseas investments, which would create withholding tax liability, PepsiCo 
restructured its international operations so that the overseas investments were 
financed by Dutch holding companies (PGI). The latter, in turn, were funded by 
PepsiCo Puerto Rico (PPR) who provided notes in exchange for advanced 
agreements. The Dutch authorities perceived this cross-border transaction 
between the US and the Netherlands as debt. PepsiCo assumed that the 
payments received from its Dutch subsidiaries pursuant to the advance 
agreements would be treated as dividends in the US and, as a result, be exempt 
from taxation. The Internal Revenue Service, however, disagreed and claimed 
$363 million of PepsiCo and PPR in unpaid taxes for years between 1998 and 
2002. 
The case was brought before the US Tax Court which ruled in favour of 
PepsiCo.41 Indeed, after identifying 13 factors to consider in characterising the 
instrument, the court argued that several factors, including the long maturity 
	
	
41 Patrick Temple-West and Howard Goller, ‘PepsiCo Wins Debt-vs-Equity Dispute in 
US Tax Court’ (Reuters, 25 September 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pepsi-
tax-idUSBRE88O19R20120925> accessed 24 June 2016. 
8 
 
 
 
2.4. Case study: PepsiCo 
In the PepsiCo case,40 the US Tax Court examined the characterization of Pepsi’s advance 
agreements for tax purposes. The group structure of the soft drink multinational can be 
structured as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Adv. = Advanced Agreement 
PWI = PepsiCo Worldwide Investments 
PGI = PepsiCo Global Investments 
In the mid-1990s, US company PepsiCo wanted to establish its brand in Asia and Eastern 
Europe. Instead of moving funds from the US directly to its overseas investments which would 
create withholdi g tax liability, PepsiCo r structured its international operations so that the 
overseas investments were financed by Dutch holding companies (PGI). The latter in turn were 
funded by PepsiCo Puerto Rico (PPR) who provided notes in exchange for advanced 
agreements. The Dutch authorities perceived this cross-border transaction between the US and 
the Netherlands as debt. PepsiCo assumed that the payments received from its Dutch 
subsidiaries pursuant the advance agreements would be treated as dividends in t  US and, thus, 
                                                          
40 PepsiCO Puerto Rica inc., et al.. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-269 
<http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/pepsicomemo.TCM.WPD.pdf> accessed 24 June 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US 
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Figure 3: Group Structure PepsiCo 
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dates and the subordination of payments to debt, established uncertainty of 
repayment. This, in turn, allows the court to label the advance agreements as 
equity.42  
The PepsiCo case clearly illustrates how hybrid financial instruments can 
successfully be used for tax planning purposes. Indeed, due to the lack of 
coordination between the Netherlands and the US regarding the tax treatment 
of the advance agreements, PepsiCo was able to reduce its tax liability 
significantly. A more detailed description of the debt-equity analysis of the court 
in the PepsiCo case, however, falls outside the scope of this paper. The next 
chapter examines the solution suggested by the OECD to cope with this issue 
of tax arbitrage. 
 
II. SOLUTION PROPOSED BY THE OECD 
	
In response to tax arbitrage, the OECD proposed rules that make the 
qualification of a particular payment conditional on its qualification in the other 
state. These so-called “linking rules” first appeared in the “Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues” report published by the 
OECD in 2012.43 In this report, changes to domestic law were suggested to 
counter “hybrid mismatch arrangements” which were defined by the OECD as 
“arrangements exploiting differences in the tax treatment of instruments, 
entities or transfers between two or more countries”.44  
Following the release of the report named “Addressing Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting” (BEPS),45 the OECD continued its work on hybrid mismatch 
arrangements. Indeed, among the other proposed actions, BEPS Action 2 of 
BEPS addressed the issue of hybrid mismatches.46 In addition to two Public 
Discussion Drafts,47 the OECD launched another report in 2014 suggesting 
	
	
42 Joe Dalton, ‘Does Pepsi’s Tax Court Win Reveal Super Factor in Debt-Equity Cases?’ 
(International Tax Review, 4 October 2012) 
<http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3098235/Has-PepsiCos-US-Tax-
Court-win-revealed-super-factor-in-deciding-debt-vs-equity-cases.html> accessed 24 June 
2016. 
43 OECD (n 7) 11. 
44 ibid 5. 
45 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris, OECD Publishing 2013). 
46 Reinout de Boer and Otto Marres, ‘BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements’ (2015) 43(1) Intertax 14, 14. 
47 OECD, Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws) International Organizations (Paris, OECD 
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potential solutions to different types of hybrid mismatches including those 
resulting from hybrid financial instruments.48 However, it was not until October 
2015 that the OECD published its final report on Action 2 entitled 
“Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”.49  
The first part of this report provides an overview of the OECD 
recommendations for domestic law. Regarding the deduction/non-inclusion 
schemes resulting from the utilization of hybrid financial instruments, the 
OECD suggested the implementation of domestic linking rules. Such rules aim 
to connect the domestic tax qualification of a cross-border hybrid financial 
instrument with the tax treatment in another jurisdiction.50  
The rules suggested by the OECD consist of a “primary rule” and a 
“defensive rule”.51 The primary rule allows a Member State to deny the payer a 
deduction for payments made under a hybrid financial instrument. Therefore, 
the right to tax is re-allocated by the primary rule to the country of the payer. 
Conversely, the defensive rule implies that the country of the recipient should 
include the “dividends” of the hybrid financial instrument in the taxable base of 
the recipient. However, to prevent the taxpayer from double taxation, the latter 
rule may only be applied either when no primary rule exists in the counterparty 
jurisdiction or when the existing rule is not applicable to the financial instrument 
in question. Hence, the application of the primary rule has priority over the 
application of the defensive rule. 
Furthermore, the scope of the OECD proposal is limited to related parties 
of which the shareholding in the holding company exceeds 25%.52 Nevertheless, 
OECD linking rules likewise apply to any other entity that is a party to any 
structured arrangement that has been developed to shift profits and reduce the 
tax burden.53   
In addition to the OECD, the EU also undertook initiatives against 
situations of double non-taxation deriving from mismatches. In June 2014, the 
ECOFIN Council agreed on an amendment to the Parent-Subsidiary (PS) 
																																																																																																																					
Publishing, 2014); OECD, Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements (Treaty Issues) International Organizations (Paris, OECD Publishing, 
2014). 
48 OECD (n 38). 
49 OECD (n 14). 
50 ibid 14. 
51 Deloitte, ‘BEPS Action 2, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements’ 
(Tax Alert, 16 October 2015) 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-
alert-oecd-16-october-2015.pdf> accessed 7 July 2016.  
52 OECD (n 7) 113. 
53 ibid 105. 
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Directive (2011/96) implementing a rule that links the tax treatment of a 
payment to its treatment in another State.54 The new EU provision in the PS 
Directive differs from the OECD recommendations in the sense that it does not 
make a distinction between a “primary rule” and a “defensive rule”. Instead, it 
merely obliges Member States to implement a linking rule with a defensive 
nature.55 A similar provision is included in the proposal for an EU Anti-
Avoidance Directive, published on 28 January 2016.56 The proposal sums up a 
number of measures designed to implement BEPS Action Plan, from CFC 
legislation to hybrid mismatch rules. Nevertheless, since the legality of 
secondary EU law remains outside the scope of this paper, no further value is 
attached to the EU initiatives. 
 
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF OECD LINKING RULES 
	
The previous chapter examined the solution suggested by the OECD to address 
the issue of tax arbitrage. This chapter further analyses whether Action 2 will 
successfully achieve its goal. To answer this question, the enforceability of 
OECD linking rules is determined in the light of EU law. In this regard, the 
analytical framework of the ECJ will be used as a benchmark. 
 
Primacy of EU law 
	
Direct taxation (i.e. income taxation) is regarded as a matter of each Member 
State’s sovereignty, while the authority to regulate indirect taxation (i.e. value 
added tax) belongs to the EU.57 Nevertheless, for direct tax rules to be 
enforceable domestically, it is settled ECJ case law that Member States need to 
respect supranational EU law.58 This follows from the “primacy of EU law” 
principle. This, in turn, goes back to the milestone case Van Gend & Loos in 
	
	
54 Council Directive 2014/86/EU amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States [2014] OJ L 219.  
55 Council Directive (n 54) art 1 (1)(a).  
56 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market [2016] COM/2016/026 final. 
57 Mathieu Isenbaert, EC Law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation 
(IBFD 2008) 220. 
58 Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] ECR I-2651, para 19; Case C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer [2005] ECR I-10837, para 29. 
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which the Court recognised for the first time that EU law prevails over national 
law.59   
When assessing the relationship between direct tax laws and EU law, the 
ECJ considers whether they constitute a breach of the EU fundamental 
freedoms. The TFEU comprises the following fundamental freedoms:60 
• Free movement of goods (Article 28); 
• Free movement for workers (Article 45); 
• Right of establishment (Article 49) and freedom to provide services 
(Article 56);  
• Free movement of capital (Article 63). 
These four freedoms constitute the basis on which the ECJ assesses the 
relationship between domestic law and EU law. The question as to which 
fundamental freedom is at stake in each case is relevant, as only the free 
movement of capital applies to third-country situations and is, therefore, not 
limited to pure EU cases. However, as the ECJ has yet to rule in a general 
manner on the hierarchy between the fundamental freedoms, the question 
concerning the prevalence of any freedom will receive no further attention 
throughout this paper.  
Furthermore, in performing its assessment, the ECJ adopts a self-
developed analytical framework. This framework will likewise be used in the 
paragraphs below to determine the enforceability of OECD linking rules in the 
light of EU law. Figure 4 below provides an overview of the analytical 
framework adopted by the ECJ.  
 
	
	
59 Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos [1963] CMLR 105. 
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Before invoking EU law against a potentially discriminatory measure, one 
needs to determine the existence of a cross-border element. Indeed, the 
application of the EU treaties is conditioned on the existence of a cross-border 
element.61 Given the inherent cross-border context in which hybrid mismatches 
arise, one can assume that the EU founding treaties, including the TFEU which 
incorporates the fundamental freedoms, are applicable. In the next step, the 
question arises whether a measure should be perceived as discriminatory. 
 
(C)overt discrimination 
	
According to the ECJ, each of the fundamental freedoms encompasses a non-
discrimination principle, which implies that in tax matters “comparable 
situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be 
treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified”.62 This 
principle not only bans overt discrimination on grounds of nationality, but also 
covert discrimination. A measure gives rise to covert discrimination when it is 
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“intrinsically liable to affect” cross-border situations more than pure domestic 
situations.63  
Regarding linking rules, a deduction or an exemption might be denied if a 
hybrid instrument is treated differently under the laws of two or more 
jurisdictions. Since mismatches by their nature arise exclusively in a cross-border 
context,64 no primary rule or defensive rule can be triggered in purely domestic 
situations. Indeed, contrary to taxpayers operating abroad, those who only 
conclude contracts domestically, do not bear the risk of losing their tax benefits 
following the application of linking rules. Hence, despite their neutral 
formulation, one would expect that linking rules are intrinsically liable to affect 
cross-border situations and, thus, give rise to covert discrimination. 
Whether linking rules are discriminatory, depends ultimately on the 
comparability analysis carried out by the ECJ.65 Indeed, discrimination only 
arises when comparable situations are treated differently for tax purposes, unless 
such difference is objectively justified.66 Therefore, the comparability of the 
domestic situation with the cross-border situation is critical in analysing the 
existence of discrimination. In that regard, the ECJ adopts two approaches: the 
“per-country approach” which considers the situation of the taxpayer on a 
stand-alone basis, and the “overall approach” which looks at the cross-border 
situation as a whole.67  
 
Per-country approach 
	
The first approach under which the ECJ carries out its comparability analysis is 
the per-country approach. According to this approach, no consideration is given 
to the different tax treatment in other Member States. Instead, it requires that 
	
	
63 Niels Bammens, The Principle of Non-Discrimination in International and European Tax Law 
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66 Case C-354/95 National Farmers' Union and Others [1997] ECR I-4559, para 61. 
67 Jessica Di Maria, ‘Comparability in the Case of Hybrid Mismatch: In Search of an 
Approach Suitable for the Current European Landscape’ in Kasper Dziurdz and 
Christoph Machgraber (eds), Non-Discrimination in European and Tax Treaty Law (Linde 
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the ECJ only examines the tax treatment of a stand-alone taxpayer in contrast 
with the situation of comparable taxpayers from the same jurisdiction.68 
The Court used this approach in the Eurowings case.69 In this case, a 
German-resident company leasing aircrafts from a lessor in Ireland was 
subjected to a higher trade tax than a similar company who leased the same 
goods from a lessor in Germany. According to the Court, this measure violated 
the freedom to provide services. Germany tried to justify its difference in tax 
treatment by arguing that the Irish-resident lessor was subjected to lower 
taxation than in Germany. The Court, however, dismissed this argument, 
because “[a]ny tax advantage resulting for providers of services from the low 
taxation to which they are subject in the Member State in which they are 
established cannot be used by another Member State to justify less favourable 
treatment in tax matters given to recipients of services established in the latter 
State”.70 
In short, in Eurowings, the ECJ analysed the disadvantage regarding 
transactions with non-residents under German law on a stand-alone basis and, 
thus, disregarded the potentially favourable tax treatment in other Member 
States. The Court adopted the same reasoning in its later case law. Regarding 
financial benefits reserved for recipients of dividends of domestic companies, 
the ECJ argued in the Lenz case that “the level of taxation of companies 
established [abroad] cannot justify a refusal to grant those same financial 
advantages to persons receiving revenue from capital paid by those latter 
companies”.71  
 
Overall approach 
	
As opposed to the per-country approach, the overall approach implies that the 
ECJ examines the cross-border situation as a whole when carrying out its 
comparability analysis. Thus, in addition to the tax treatment of a taxpayer in 
their country of residence, consideration is given to the different tax treatment 
in other Member States.72 Once the overall tax burden of a taxpayer or group of 
taxpayers is determined in the light of different jurisdictions, the ECJ looks at 
similar situations to assess whether discrimination exists. 
	
	
68 Carril (n 65) 109. 
69 Case C-294/97 Eurowings [1999] ECR I-7449. 
70 ibid para 44. 
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The ECJ first introduced the overall approach in the Schumacker case.73 
This case concerned the denial of tax benefits for family circumstances by 
German tax authorities to a Belgian resident who earned 90% of his income 
from work carried out in Germany. Under German tax law, such advantages 
were only available to residents in Germany. According to Schumacker, this 
constituted a breach of freedom of movement for workers, because he would 
receive tax benefits as a German resident due to his family circumstances. For 
its assessment of possible discrimination, the Court looked at the tax treatment 
of Schumacker in Belgium. It determined that Belgium could not grant any 
benefits for family circumstances, as Germany was allowed to tax Schumacker’s 
profits under the Belgium-Germany double tax treaty.74 Therefore, by taking 
into account the overall tax treatment of Schumacker, the ECJ decided that the 
State of employment, Germany, was obliged to provide the tax benefits in 
question. 
The ECJ followed a similar approach in the Schempp case.75 In this case, the 
ECJ accepted German rules, under which the deductibility of alimony payments 
depended upon the taxable outcome in another Member State. Mr Schempp 
was a German resident taxpayer who paid alimony to his former spouse in 
Austria. Under German law, maintenance payments were deductible, provided 
that they were taxed in the hands of the recipient. Since such payments were not 
taxed in Austria, Mr Schempp was unable to claim a deduction in his German 
tax return. According to Mr Schempp, a deduction would have been granted if 
his former spouse was a resident of Germany. Despite this existing difference in 
treatment as opposed to situations where alimony is paid to German residents, 
the Court concluded that German law was not discriminatory due to the lack of 
comparability between the two situations.76 Indeed, in contrast to Austrian law, 
German law requires that alimony payments are subject to taxation. Because of 
this different tax treatment, alimony payments to an Austrian resident cannot be 
compared to similar payments to a German resident. Since discrimination can 
only arise in comparable situations, the Court found that German law was 
compatible with EU law.77 
Along the lines of the judgement in Schumacker and Schempp, one would 
expect that a cross-border situation in which a mismatch arises regarding hybrid 
financial instruments, cannot be compared to a domestic situation where no 
mismatch exists regarding the same instrument.78 Due to this lack of 
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comparability, linking rules which deny tax benefits in cross-border situations 
should not be considered discriminatory.  
 
Comparability in the event of tax arbitrage 
	
Regarding OECD linking rules, the approach employed by the ECJ in carrying 
out its comparability analysis will have a significant impact on its findings. If the 
Court follows a per-country approach which focuses on the situation of the 
taxpayer on a stand-alone basis, one would expect that it will ignore the tax 
treatment of the counterparty jurisdiction when assessing the discriminatory 
nature of linking rules. Consequently, a discrimination arises between cross-
border situations and domestic situations since two comparable taxpayers are 
subjected to a different tax treatment. Conversely, under an overall approach 
which examines the cross-border situation as a whole, one would expect that, 
along the lines of the judgement in Schumacker and Schempp, the ECJ will perceive 
cross-border hybrid mismatches as incomparable to domestic situations 
regarding the same hybrid instrument, but without classification conflict. Due to 
this lack of comparability, linking rules which deny tax benefits in cross-border 
situations should not be considered discriminatory.  
As the ECJ has not shown preference for either of the aforementioned 
approaches, legal uncertainty prevails regarding the question whether or not the 
implementation of OECD linking rules creates discrimination and, thereby, 
infringes the EU fundamental freedoms. Hence, for the sake of legal certainty, 
the ECJ should take a clear position when performing its comparability analysis 
in the future. In this author’s view, since policy considerations supporting anti-
hybrid mismatch measures exist, the overall approach should be upheld. Indeed, 
tax arbitrage not only results in significant revenue loss, but it also causes 
distortion of competition between companies subjected to different tax 
avoidance requirements. Furthermore, it violates the principle of neutrality, 
since taxpayers are encouraged to invest abroad rather than in their home 
country, which in turn causes a negative impact on economic efficiency.79 
However, Di Maria raises one convincing argument to support the per-country 
approach.80 She argues that the per-country approach corresponds to the 
current European landscape in which Member States can freely draw up their 
tax policies. Indeed, because they enjoy sovereignty in direct taxation, Member 
States cannot be required to adjust their tax rules to those of other jurisdictions. 
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Therefore, the overall approach of the Court should not be perceived desirable 
in a non-harmonised European tax environment.81  
In any case, considering the preeminent risk that the ECJ finds linking 
rules discriminatory following the per-country approach, it is worth examining 
the next step of the ECJ analytical framework, namely the question as to 
whether a potential restriction can be justified on grounds of an overriding 
public interest.  
 
Justification of potential discrimination 
	
Rule of reason  
	
The ECJ has adopted a doctrine of justification (“rule of reason”) to justify 
breaches of the fundamental freedoms resulting from discriminatory measures. 
Indeed, in the Cassis de Dijon case,82 the Court accepted for the first time 
unwritten justification grounds which constitute an overriding reason in the 
public interest.83 Since then, a variety of justification grounds have been 
introduced. However, this section will only focus on those which are closely 
related to tax arbitrage, namely the prevention of tax abuse and the fiscal 
coherence.  
As a preliminary point, one could argue that ensuring single taxation 
constitutes an overriding reason which justifies the potential restriction of the 
EU basic freedoms. Nevertheless, the ECJ has not yet recognized such 
justification ground.84 Indeed, as the Court has stated, “it is settled case law that 
any advantage resulting from the low taxation to which a subsidiary established 
in a Member State other than the one in which the parent company was 
incorporated is subject cannot by itself authorise that Member State to offset 
that advantage by less favourable tax treatment of the parent company”.85 
Consequently, the mere fact that hybrid financial instruments can reduce the 
overall tax liability of a taxpayer due to their different tax treatment in another 
Member State, does not justify a potential restriction. In addition to low 
taxation, other reasons that are connected to hybrid mismatches, but have been 
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82 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG [1979] ECR 649. 
83 ibid para 8. 
84 Jakob Bundgaard, ‘Hybrid Financial Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 2’ (2013) 
53(12) European Taxation 587, 587. 
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rejected by the Court, include loss of tax revenue,86 as well as double non-
taxation.87 
 
Prevention of tax abuse 
	
The prevention of tax abuse is the first justification accepted by the ECJ, which 
is also relevant to the field of hybrid mismatches. In Cadbury Schweppes, the ECJ 
argued that a restriction on the fundamental freedom of establishment may be 
justified by the prevention of tax avoidance, provided that it specifically targets 
“wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality”.88 Thus, 
to be perceived justifiable by the ECJ, a restricting measure that prevents tax 
avoidance cannot have a general scope. Instead, its application must be limited 
to “wholly artificial arrangements”. The latter do not reflect economic reality 
and have the objective of circumventing tax laws.89  
In the same case, the ECJ identified two factors that determine whether a 
transaction constitutes an artificial arrangement: the subjective element and the 
objective element. The subjective element refers to the intention of the taxpayer 
to avoid taxes, while the objective factor relates to the failure to comply with 
elements ascertainable by third parties which suggest that the arrangement 
corresponds to economic reality.90 Both elements need to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis. An example of a wholly artificial arrangement proposed by 
the court is a “letterbox”,91 which is established merely for tax purposes and 
does not conduct economic activity. Additionally, restrictive tax measures need 
to comply with the principle of proportionality. Therefore, taxpayers must be 
given the opportunity to prove that any genuine economic justification exists for 
its actions.92 
In light of the Cadbury Schweppes case, it seems unlikely that OECD linking 
rules can be justified by the prevention of tax avoidance. Indeed, although they 
may be used to obtain tax savings, hybrid financial instruments usually serve the 
objective of financing investments and economic activities.93 Thus, not all 
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hybrid financial instruments can be considered “wholly artificially arrangements” 
as they will generally fail to pass the objective test. Limiting the scope of their 
linking rules to wholly artificial arrangements, would allow Member States to 
comply with the Cadbury Schweppes doctrine. However, one would expect that 
this undermines the effectiveness of linking rules since most financial 
instruments would fall outside their scope. 
Alternatively, Member States could avoid the strict “wholly artificial 
arrangement” requirement of the Cadbury Schweppes judgement by invoking the 
prevention of the tax abuse justification in combination with the preservation of 
a balanced allocation of taxing rights. The latter, which was first introduced in 
the Mark & Spencer case in 2005,94 entails that Member States have the right to 
levy taxes on either a tax subject or a tax object (or both) that has a reasonable 
tie with its tax jurisdiction.95 The ECJ accepts that, without fulfilling the wholly 
artificial requirement, the prevention of tax abuse can still justify a 
discrimination provided that the balanced allocation ground is met. Indeed, in 
determining that Belgian transfer pricing regulation complies with EU law, the 
ECJ used a joint assessment of both justification grounds in the SGI case.96 
Regarding the artificial arrangement requirement, the Court argued that “[e]ven 
if the specific purpose of a national legislation is not to exempt from tax 
benefits prescribed in the law fictitious arrangements that are not economically 
viable […] such legislation may nonetheless be considered justified in this 
context by the aim to prevent tax avoidance in conjunction with the aim to 
maintain a balanced allocation of taxing rights between member states”.97 The 
Court followed a similar approach in the Oy AA case concerning the Finnish 
cross-border loss relief.98  
Following this case law, one could argue that, regarding OECD linking 
rules, the ECJ would likewise adopt a joint assessment of justification grounds. 
However, it remains undetermined whether the ECJ will allow the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights as a justification ground for linking rules. As pointed 
out by Bundgaard,99 their intention is not to protect a State’s tax claim regarding 
the activities carried out on its territory, but to eliminate potential tax savings 
that arise from a divergence in qualification between countries. In other words, 
OECD linking rules are adopted to counter double non-taxation in the OECD 
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Member States altogether, rather than to protect the tax base of single Member 
States. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that the ECJ will accept the balanced 
allocation of taxing right, in combination with the prevention of tax abuse as 
potential justification grounds for linking rules. 
 
Fiscal coherence 
	
One of BEPS’s policy goals is establishing “international coherence in corporate 
income taxation”.100 Like the OECD, the ECJ recognises the importance of 
fiscal coherence by accepting it as a justification ground.  The coherence 
justification allows Member States to maintain a symmetry between the 
taxability of an income and the deductibility of the corresponding expense.101 
The ECJ first introduced this justification ground in the Bachmann case.102  This 
case dealt with the relation between the deductibility of insurance premiums 
paid in Belgium and the taxability of the pensions paid by insurers. According to 
Belgian law, contributions paid to an insurer under a pension contract in 
Belgium were deductible when the pensions related to the contributions were 
likewise taxable in Belgium. Bachmann, who concluded a pension contract with 
a non-Belgian insurance company, was not allowed to deduct his contributions 
as they were not paid in Belgium. According to the Court, the discriminatory tax 
treatment of insurance contributions was justified by fiscal coherence, as 
Belgium had no certainty that it would be able to tax the amounts paid by 
foreign insurers.103  
Regarding OECD linking rules, fiscal coherence could be evoked as a 
potential justification since a connection arises between the tax benefit of one 
company and the tax disadvantage of another company. However, in later case 
law, the Court refined the coherence ground by requiring the existence of a 
direct link between the tax benefit and the fiscal burden. Initially, such a direct 
link requires that the tax levy and tax benefit must be present in the same 
category of tax and with regard to the same taxpayer.104 Hence, the ECJ has 
rejected in the past the existence of a direct link between the right to tax profits 
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of a subsidiary abroad and the deduction of losses of a subsidiary located in the 
United Kingdom (UK), because it concerned different taxpayers.105  
Following the strict reasoning of the Court, one would expect that a direct 
link likewise does not exist regarding OECD linking rules, as both the primary 
rule and the defensive rule do not relate to the same taxpayer. Indeed, the tax 
benefit of one subsidiary is aligned to the tax treatment of the hybrid instrument 
in the hands of another subsidiary. Consequently, numerous scholars have 
argued that, due to the lack of “direct link”, OECD linking rules cannot be 
justified on the ground of fiscal coherence.106  
However, one cannot simply ignore the fact that, over the years, the Court 
has adopted a less rigorous approach regarding the direct link requirement. The 
Marks & Spencer case of 2005, for example, concerned the deductibility of losses 
in foreign subsidiaries against its taxable profits in the UK.107 In that case, the 
ECJ found the refusal of the UK to allow the claim of Marks & Spencer 
justifiable on three different grounds. In addition to the prevention of tax abuse 
and the double deduction of losses, the Court accepted the denial on the basis 
that “profits and losses are two sides of the same coin and must be treated 
symmetrically in the same tax system” (even though they did not concern the 
same taxpayer).108 Along the same lines, the Court has considered the coherence 
justification in numerous cases regarding the distribution of dividends without 
referring to the existence of a direct link in the event of one and the same 
taxpayer.109 
Moreover, the ECJ seems to abandon the condition of a direct link 
regarding a single taxpayer even further by moving the question of fiscal 
coherence from the national level to the broader level of States entering into tax 
treaties.110 Indeed, in the Danner case, the Court ruled that, due to the double 
taxation conventions “fiscal cohesion is no longer established in relation to one 
and the same person… but is shifted to another level, that of the reciprocity of 
the rules applicable in the Contracting States”.111 Neyt and Peeters argue that 
the Court applied a similar reasoning in case K.112 In that case, the ECJ found a 
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direct link between the capital losses at the occasion of the sale of real estate in 
France and its potential capital gains.113 According to the authors, one could 
posit that, from the viewpoint of the Member States concerned, the losses and 
profits are not directly linked “on the level of each taxpayer individually, but on 
a higher level between all profits and all losses with respect to their respective 
foreign real estate”.114 
In accordance with the above case law, AG Kokott claimed that the 
coherence justification is applicable even if the fiscal burden and tax advantage 
do not regard to the same taxpayer, provided that a twofold prerequisite is 
met.115 Firstly, it is required that tax advantage and tax burden concern the same 
income or the same economic process. Secondly, the tax disadvantage which 
accrues to one taxpayer needs to be “real and in the same amount” as the tax 
advantage accruing to the other taxpayer.  
Since linking rules align the tax treatment of a hybrid financial instrument 
in one jurisdiction with the tax outcome of the same instrument in another 
jurisdiction, no concerns shall arise regarding the first condition. However, the 
same cannot be said for the second requirement. Indeed, due to different 
corporate income tax rates among Member States, the tax advantage of one 
taxpayer will differ from the tax disadvantage accruing to the other. The 
application of the primary rule can be used as an example to illustrate this. 
Suppose a payment of 100 EUR is deductible at the level of the payer at a 
10% rate, while the corresponding amount is taxed at the level of the recipient 
at a 30% rate. Due to a mismatch, the recipient is granted a tax exemption 
regarding the full amount which results in a tax benefit of 30 EUR (100 x 30%). 
Under the primary rule the deduction of the same amount in the hands of the 
payer will be rejected, accruing a tax disadvantage to the latter of only 10 EUR 
(100 x 10%).  
The most effective method to ensure equality between the tax advantage 
and the tax disadvantage would be the harmonisation of the corporate income 
tax rate among OECD Member States. However, considering the refusal of a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base,116 it seems highly unlikely that, 
even within the EU, States would be willing to harmonize their income tax rates. 
Whether this precludes the existence of a direct link regarding linking rules, 
depends on the value that the ECJ attaches to the difference in income tax rate 
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between the country of the payer, where the payment is deducted, and the 
country of the recipient, where the payment is taxed. At least in the Schempp 
case, the Court did not pay much attention to these different rates. Therefore, 
German law which made the deductibility of alimony payments depend on the 
taxable outcome in another Member State was found compatible with EU law. 
Regarding linking rules, one could argue that, in line with Schempp, the Court will 
identify a direct link between the fiscal burden and the tax benefit by 
disregarding the difference in tax rates among the countries concerned.  
Although the current version of the linking rules successfully eliminates 
situations of double non-taxation, the same cannot be said for double taxation. 
Indeed, pursuant to the defensive rule, the country of the recipient must include 
the “dividends” of the hybrid financial instrument in the taxable base of the 
recipient when these are deductible in the hands of the payer. However, there is 
no provision in place that requires the country of the recipient to provide an 
exemption if the payment is not deductible in the country of the payer following 
the application of tax deductibility restrictions (for example, thin cap and 
transfer pricing regulation). One could argue that the one-sided nature of the 
linking rules prevents the existence of fiscal coherence. Indeed, as noted by AG 
Kokott, fiscal coherence generally entails “no more than avoiding double 
taxation or ensuring that income is actually taxed, but only once (the principle of 
only-once taxation)”.117  Along the same lines, Helminen argues that a coherent 
tax system implies that “always when a payment is deductible, the payment is 
taxable as regards the recipient, and always when a payment is not deductible, it 
is exempt as regards the recipient”.118 Following this reasoning, linking rules can 
only be justified if they work bilaterally in the way that one State is obliged to 
provide a tax benefit for a payment when the other State refused to give one 
regarding the same payment. Consequently, Member States should not only 
implement linking rules suggested by the OECD to neutralize double non-
taxation, but likewise implement the following rules that cover double taxation. 
• Regarding the primary rule: “The payments are deductible to the extent that 
such payments are not exempt in hands of the recipient”. 
• Regarding the defensive rule: “The payments are exempt to the extent that 
such payments are not deductible in the hands of the payer”. 
By combining OECD linking rules with the rules suggested above, 
Member States respect fiscal coherence, because the income from a cross-
border transaction is only taxed once. Furthermore, this outcome can be 
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rationalized on theoretical as well as practical grounds.119 Firstly, on a theoretical 
level, eliminating both situations of double taxation and double non-taxation 
avoids the rise of distortion and, thus, creates economic efficiency. Indeed, the 
decision of economic agents to invest abroad or in their home country remains 
unaffected, because cross-border transactions are neither taxed more heavily nor 
less onerous than domestic transactions. Secondly, from a practical perspective, 
double taxation can result in a very high fiscal burden which discourages cross-
border investments. Conversely, double non-taxation creates an incentive for 
taxpayers to invest in foreign jurisdictions and to erode the tax base of their 
home State. 
Based on the above, one would expect that any discrimination resulting 
from the application of linking rules can be justified by fiscal coherence. 
Whether these rules should, therefore, be considered enforceable in the light of 
EU law, depends on the evaluation of the final stage of the ECJ analytical 
framework which encompasses the proportionality test.  
 
Proportionality principle 
	
As a final step, the ECJ considers whether domestic rules are not 
disproportionate in achieving their goal. This so-called “proportionality” 
principle can be divided into two sub-tests. Firstly, it implies that domestic 
legislation breaching EU law does not go beyond what is necessary to obtain its 
objective. Secondly,  it requires that a violation of the four freedoms is 
appropriate to achieve its aim.120  
In the light of the ECJ judgement in the Papillon case,121 it remains 
questionable whether the ECJ would perceive the current version of OECD 
linking rules “not to go beyond what is necessary” to attain their objective of 
fiscal coherence and, thus, pass the first proportionality sub-test. The Papillon 
case concerned the French tax consolidation regime which provided for the 
neutrality of intra-group transactions. The regime only applied to French 
companies and was not applicable to subsidiaries of the parent which were 
indirectly held through a non-resident subsidiary. According to the Court, the 
French regime achieved fiscal coherence, because a direct link existed between 
tax advantages of the consolidation regime and the neutralization of intra-group 
transactions, which avoided a double deduction of losses at the level of resident 
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companies subjected to the consolidation regime.122 However, the subsidiaries 
of the non-resident subsidiary were unable to prove that no risk of double use 
of losses existed in their particular case. Therefore, the Court argued that the 
French legislation, which did not provide the companies involved the 
opportunity to provide proof to the contrary, went beyond what was necessary 
to attain its aim of fiscal coherence, and was thus perceived disproportionate.123 
Following this judgement, Member States implementing OECD linking 
rules will have to afford the taxpayer, whose tax benefit is denied, the 
opportunity to prove that no divergence in the qualification of the hybrid 
financial instrument emerges. Otherwise, the Court may conclude that, due to 
their automatic application, OECD linking rules go beyond what is necessary to 
attain fiscal coherence. Moreover, considering the effectiveness principle, the 
right to provide counterproof cannot be excessively burdensome, “so as to 
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law”.124 The question arises as to whether the burden 
of proof of the tax treatment in another State does not impose an excessive 
onus to the taxpayer that could constitute a breach of the effectiveness 
principle. Arguably, such an administrative constrain can be condoned since the 
Mutual Assistance Directive provides the required information regarding the tax 
treatment of a financial instruments in other Member States.125 Indeed, in its 
previous case law, the ECJ has already considered the application of the Mutual 
Assistance Directive in determining whether an excessive administrative burden 
can serve as a potential justification.126 
Regarding the appropriateness of OECD linking rules in achieving fiscal 
coherence, it is important to note that their scope does not cover all situations 
of hybrid mismatches. Indeed, while the qualification of payments between 
related parties (and unrelated entities that are party of a structured arrangement) 
are aligned under OECD linking rules, double non-taxation can still arise 
regarding payments between regular unrelated parties. Due to the different 
treatment between related and unrelated parties, OECD linking rules are not in 
every respect adequate to achieve their objective.127 Indeed, the second ECJ 
proportionality sub-test will only be met if situations of double non-taxation are 
abolished entirely. Hence, although there are practical reasons to rationalize the 
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limited scope of application (for example, the gathering of information 
regarding tax classification), Member States should extend the scope of the 
OECD proposals to include unrelated parties.  
 
CONCLUSION 
	
The research question addressed in this paper is the following: “Are OECD 
linking rules proposed in Action 2 suitable to address tax arbitrage enforceable 
in the light of EU law?” 
To answer this question, the following topics have been examined above: 
the issue of tax arbitrage, BEPS Action 2, and the analytical framework adopted 
by the ECJ. 
The use of hybrid financial instruments in cross border-transactions may 
give rise to a double tax benefit due to the lack of harmonization in tax 
classification systems currently applicable among jurisdictions. This issue of tax 
arbitrage negatively affects tax revenue, competition, economic efficiency, 
transparency and fairness. To cope with the externalities resulting from tax 
arbitrage, the OECD proposes the implementation of linking rules in BEPS 
Action 2. These rules make the qualification of a particular payment conditional 
on its qualification in the other State in order to ensure that cross-border hybrid 
instruments are always subject to tax.  
The ECJ adopted an analytical framework which encompasses several 
steps to assess the compatibility of domestic law with EU law. Following these 
steps, one would expect that linking rules suggested by the OECD as a means to 
address tax arbitrage are enforceable in the light of EU law, provided that the 
Member States implementing these rules complement them with additional 
conditions. Firstly, by modifying linking rules domestically in the way that they 
not only eliminate double non-taxation but also double taxation, Member States 
can fully respect fiscal coherence. Hence, any potential discrimination resulting 
from the application of linking rules can be justified by an overriding reason in 
the public interest. Secondly, Member States should afford the taxpayer, whose 
tax benefit is denied, the opportunity to prove that no divergence in the 
qualification of the hybrid financial instrument emerges. Otherwise, linking rules 
would violate the proportionality principle by going beyond what is necessary to 
attain fiscal coherence. Thirdly, the proportionality principle likewise requires 
that linking rules are suitable to achieve their objective. Since fiscal coherence 
requires that double non-taxation is entirely abolished, Member States have to 
extend the scope of the OECD proposals to include unrelated parties.  
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In conclusion, under the right conditions, OECD linking rules successfully 
address tax arbitrage. However, only time will tell whether Member States want 
to implement such conditions, and whether they are keen on implementing 
linking rules in the first place. 
